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Abstract: Interdependent situations are pervasive in human life. In these situations, it is essential to form expectations
about the others’ behaviour to adapt one’s own behaviour to increase mutual outcomes and avoid exploitation. Social
value orientation, which describes the dispositional weights individuals attach to their own and to another person’s
outcome, predicts these expectations of cooperation in social dilemmas—an interdependent situation involving a
conflict of interests. Yet, scientific evidence is inconclusive about the exact differences in expectations between
prosocials, individualists, and competitors. The present meta-analytic results show that, relative to proselfs (individ-
ualists and competitors), prosocials expect more cooperation from others in social dilemmas, whereas individualists
and competitors do not significantly differ in their expectations. The importance of these expectations in the decision
process is further highlighted by the finding that they partially mediate the well-established relation between social
value orientation and cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. In fact, even proselfs are more likely to cooperate
when they expect their partner to cooperate. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology
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Human cooperation is a topic that cuts across several scien-
tific disciplines. The general goal is to understand the
mechanisms supporting cooperation. An especially impor-
tant scientific challenge involves understanding human co-
operation in social dilemmas (i.e. situations in which
short-term self-interest conflicts with long-term collective
interests; Parks, Joireman, & Van Lange, 2013; Van Lange,
Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). Notably, many social
dilemmas involve decision makers with little to no informa-
tion about the motives and likely actions of others—for ex-
ample, in group projects with new colleagues. In these
situations, the decision maker’s dispositional concern for
others’ welfare [or social value orientation (SVO);
prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientation; Van
Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997] and expecta-
tions about others’ choices affect cooperation. Yet, it is
not clear whether or how these two key variables work to-
gether in promoting cooperation.
According to the goal-expectation hypothesis (Pruitt &
Kimmel, 1977), cooperation requires both the goal of
cooperating (i.e. a desire to maximize joint outcomes) and
the expectation that one’s partner(s) will cooperate. In other
words, SVO interacts with expectations to drive cooperation,
such that only prosocials who expect others to cooperate will
themselves cooperate (Boone, Declerck, & Kiyonari, 2010).
An alternative possibility is that social motives influence ex-
pectations which in turn predict levels of cooperation.
Restated, expectations (at least partially) mediate the impact
of SVO on cooperation. In their thorough review of the liter-
ature on SVO, expectations, and cooperation, Bogaert,
Boone, and Declerck (2008) offer an integrative model pro-
posing that expectations serve to both moderate and mediate
the impact of social motives on cooperation.
In the present paper, we utilize meta-analysis to test both
the moderation and mediation models. While it is clear that
cooperation in social dilemmas is reliably associated with
differences in SVO (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009) and
expectations (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013), it is less clear
how SVO and expectations work together to drive coopera-
tion. Our meta-analysis offers four contributions to the work
on SVO and cooperation in social dilemmas. First, we esti-
mate if the three primary SVOs (i.e. prosocials, individual-
ists, and competitors) differ in their expectations of partner
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cooperation. Previous research has been inconclusive regard-
ing the exact magnitude of differences in expectations, espe-
cially when comparing individualists and competitors (e.g.
Kuhlman &Wimberley, 1976; Van Lange, 1992). Moreover,
studies always contain very few individuals who
dispositionally pursue relative gains over others (i.e. compet-
itors, about 12% of the population; Au & Kwong, 2004; Van
Lange et al., 1997), and a meta-analysis can provide a rela-
tively high-powered test whether competitors differ from
the more common prosocials and individualists in their ex-
pectations of others’ cooperation. Second, we examine how
variability across the studies affects the relation between
SVO and expectations of others’ cooperation, such as group
size, participant payment, and one-shot versus repeated inter-
actions. Third, we harness recent developments in meta-
analysis to provide the first meta-analytic test of the indirect
effect of expectations on the relation between SVO and co-
operation in social dilemmas. Fourth, we test the assertion
that prosocials condition their cooperation on expected part-
ner cooperation, but that individualists’ and competitors’ de-
cisions to cooperate are independent of expected partner
cooperation.
SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION AND
COOPERATION IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS
A long history of theoretical development and experimental
research in the social and biological sciences has focused
on understanding human cooperation in a situation when co-
operation is difficult to achieve—social dilemmas (Van
Lange et al., 2013). A social dilemma is an interdependent
social interaction that contains a conflict between individual
and collective interests (Dawes, 1980). In social dilemmas,
individuals can achieve the best outcome by deciding not to
cooperate while the partner does cooperate [temptation out-
come (T)]. However, mutual cooperation [reward outcome
(R)] always yields a larger outcome than mutual defection
[punishment outcome (P)]. The worst possible outcome oc-
curs by cooperating with a partner who does not cooperate
[sucker outcome (S)]. The payoffs in all social dilemmas fol-
low the same basic structure: T > R > P > S, and all social
dilemmas contain a clear structural incentive to defect.
The most widely studied personality construct in rela-
tion to cooperation in social dilemmas is SVO—defined
in terms of the dispositional weights individuals assign to
their own and to others’ outcomes in interdependent situa-
tions (Kuhlman, Camac, & Cunha, 1986; McClintock,
1972). The SVO construct is derived from research on be-
haviour in experimental games. Traditional game theory as-
sumes that the decisions of individuals in interdependent
situations are governed by a motivation to maximize own
outcomes (e.g. Luce & Raiffa, 1957), and this assumption
of ‘rational self-interest’ has dominated much subsequent
theory and research in various disciplines. Because research
uncovered considerable individual variation in behaviour in
various economic games, researchers started to examine
motives that transcend (short-term) self-interest. In particu-
lar, a guiding assumption underlying research on SVO has
been that some individuals consider not only their own out-
come in interdependent situations but also the outcomes of
other individuals (Messick & McClintock, 1968) and value
equality in outcomes (Van Lange, 1999). As such, SVO re-
flects stable individual differences in an inherent sense of
fairness and equality in outcomes.1
Three SVOs are frequently distinguished in the popula-
tion: (i) prosocials aim to equalize and/or maximize joint
outcomes; (ii) individualists aim to maximize their own out-
comes, regardless of the others’ outcomes; and (iii) compet-
itors aim to maximize the relative difference between their
own and the others’ outcome. Individualists and competi-
tors are often combined in a proself category (Liebrand,
1984; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Over the past de-
cades, SVO has usually been assessed with (i) the Triple
Dominance Measure (TDM; Van Lange et al., 1997), (ii)
the Ring Measure (Liebrand, 1984; Liebrand & McClin-
tock, 1988), and (iii) the Slider Measure (Murphy,
Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2010). Table 1 displays an ex-
ample item from each of these SVO measures. Each mea-
sure has participants allocate points between themselves
and another hypothetical individual. Furthermore, partici-
pants are told that the other individual is making the same
set of choices that affect the participant’s outcomes. For ex-
ample, in the TDM, participants choose between three op-
tions: (i) 500 points to the self, 500 points to the other
(i.e. cooperative choice), (ii) 560 points to the self, 300
points to the other (i.e. individualistic choice), or (iii) 490
points to the self and 90 points to the other (i.e. competitive
choice). In the TDM, participants are classified as either
prosocials, individualists, or competitors if they make
enough choices (six out of nine) consistent with one of
the three SVOs. The Ring Measure, in turn, allows for a
continuous and for a categorical assessment of SVO, but
shows lower test–retest reliability compared with other
measures (Liebrand, 1984). Finally, the recently developed
SVO Slider Measure overcomes the limitations of the
TDM and the Ring Measure because it is efficient and easy
to implement and shows good internal consistency while
measuring SVO as a continuous construct, with higher
scores indicating a more prosocial SVO (Murphy et al.,
2010). In this six-item measure, participants are asked to
choose between several self-other payoff combinations.
Based on their decisions, an SVO angle on a two-
dimensional space consisting of own payoff and others’
payoff can be computed. The Slider Measure has good con-
vergent validity with both the TDM and the Ring Measure
(Murphy et al., 2010).2
SVO is a feature of personality as evidenced by its tem-
poral stability (e.g. Van Lange, Bekkers, Chirumbolo, &
Leone, 2012) and its relation to several other relevant
1Although most research treats SVO as a stable dispositional personality
construct, recent research has also considered how situations can activate
state motives that are part of the SVO framework (e.g. Kelley et al., 2003;
for a recent discussion on the state versus trait approach of SVO, see
Ackermann, Fleiß, & Murphy, 2016; Pulford, Krockow, Colman, &
Lawrence, 2016).
2Research in economics has developed and studied a related construct—
conditional cooperation (Kocher, Cherry, Kroll, Netzer, & Sutter, 2008;
Vollan & Ostrom, 2010).
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personality constructs. In fact, SVO shares significant over-
lap with HEXACO Honesty-Humility (and with Big Five
Agreeableness; Hilbig, Glöckner, & Zettler, 2014).
Honesty-Humility describes the tendency to be fair and
honest (Ashton & Lee, 2007) and is associated with various
socially desirable behaviours, such as a lower likelihood to
sexually harass someone (Lee, Gizzarone, & Ashton, 2003)
or to be delinquent and criminal (De Vries & Van Gelder,
2013, 2015), and with increased interpersonal cooperation
(Thielmann & Hilbig, 2014). Similarly, decades of research
have shown that SVO reliably predicts cooperation not only
in social dilemmas (Balliet et al., 2009) but also across a
broad range of natural settings (e.g. Van Lange, 2000;
Van Lange, Van Vugt, Meertens, & Ruiter, 1998). For ex-
ample, relative to individualists and competitors, prosocials
tend to donate more to a variety of noble causes (e.g. Mc-
Clintock & Allison, 1989; Van Andel, Tybur, & Van
Lange, 2016), are more strongly involved in volunteering
(e.g. Van Lange, Schippers, & Balliet, 2011b), are more
prone to exhibit citizenship behaviour in organizations
(e.g. Nauta, De Dreu, & Van Der Vaart, 2002), and engage
more often in pro-environmental behaviour (e.g. Cameron,
Brown, & Chapman, 1998; Joireman, Lasane, Bennett,
Richards, & Solaimani, 2001).
SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION AND
EXPECTATIONS OF OTHERS’ COOPERATION
In social dilemmas, one’s own choice and predispositions
are often the basis of beliefs about the others’ behaviour,
especially in situations that lack information about the
other individuals (Holmes, 2002; Krueger & Acevedo,
2007). The most widely studied personality characteristic
used to predict expectations of others’ behaviour in social
dilemmas is SVO. Beginning with the classic work of
Kelley and Stahelski (1970a, 1970b), research focused
on individual differences in cooperative behaviour has
shown that prosocials expect more cooperation from
others in social dilemmas than proselfs (e.g. Messé &
Sivacek, 1979; Van Lange, 1999). Three models have
been offered to explain how these dispositional prefer-
ences for cooperation influence expectations of others’
cooperative preferences. First, the triangle hypothesis
proposes that previous experiences and self-fulfilling
prophecies lead prosocials to expect heterogeneous be-
haviour from others, whereas proselfs, through their
own competitive behaviour, elicit only competitive be-
haviour in others and therefore expect only competitive
behaviour from others (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970a;
Kelley & Stahelski, 1970b; Van Lange, 1992). Second,
the Structural Assumed Similarity Bias (SASB) proposes
that individuals with all SVOs project their own disposi-
tions onto others and expect others to be similar to
themselves (Kuhlman et al., 1986; Kuhlman &
Wimberley, 1976; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977).
Finally, the Cone Model only slightly differs from the
SASB as it suggests that this false consensus effect is
larger for individualists than for prosocials or competi-
tors (Iedema & Poppe, 1994b, 1999), possibly due to
the overestimation of self-interest as a dominant motive
underlying social behaviour (Miller & Ratner, 1998;
Vuolevi & Van Lange, 2010, 2012).






TDM 9 A B C Van Lange, P. A. M., Otten, W.,
De Bruin, E. M., & Joireman, J. A.
(1997). Development of prosocial,
individualistic, and competitive
orientations: Theory and preliminary
evidence. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 73, 733–746.
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.73.4.733
You Get 500 560 490
Other Gets 500 300 90
Ring 24 A B Liebrand, W. B. G. (1984). The effect
of social motives, communication and
group size on behaviour in an
N-person multi-stage mixed-motive
game. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 14, 239–264.
doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420140302
You Get 100 60
Other Gets 80 0
Slider 6† Self 100 98 96 94 93 91 89 87 85 Murphy, R. O., Ackermann, K. A.,
& Handgraaf, M. J. J. (2010).
Measuring social value orientation.
Judgment and Decision Making,
6, 771–781.
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1804189
Other 50 54 59 63 68 72 76 81 85
Note. TDM = Triple Dominance Measure; Ring = Ring Measure; Slider = Slider Measure.
†The Slider Measure also has nine secondary items that allow to distinguish between prosocials who want to maximize equality or who want to maximize mutual
outcomes.
64 J. L. Pletzer et al.
Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology Eur. J. Pers. 32: 62–83 (2018)
DOI: 10.1002/per
It is important to note that the current meta-analysis can-
not test the three models against each other because the
models make predictions about the social dynamics and psy-
chological processes that give rise to the social projection of
SVO, and not directly about expected cooperation in social
dilemmas.3 However, it can be assumed that expectations
about the distribution of SVO in the population correlate
quite highly with expectations of others’ cooperation in
social dilemmas. Hence, the underlying mechanism of
self-fulfilling prophecies or social projection might drive
differences in expectations, and subsequently cooperation,
as well. Importantly, it needs to be stressed that all three
accounts propose that expectations precede and determine
cooperative behaviour, which is supported by findings
showing that dispositional, manipulated, and situation-
specific trust all facilitate cooperative behaviour (Boone
et al., 2010; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975). While these
models diverge on the underlying mechanisms linking dif-
ferent SVOs to expectations in social dilemmas, they all
also concur that SVO strongly determines expectations of
cooperation, such that more prosocially-minded individuals
should also expect more cooperation from others. Despite
this long-standing assumption, existing evidence is incon-
clusive about the exact magnitude of these differences in
expected cooperation between prosocials, individualists,
and competitors, pointing to the value of meta-analytically
estimating these effects.
SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION, EXPECTATIONS,
AND COOPERATION: A MEDIATION MODEL
In addition to meta-analysing the effect of SVO on expecta-
tions, we were interested in determining whether expecta-
tions mediate the influence of SVO on cooperation. In fact,
two prior meta-analyses point to that possibility, as coopera-
tion in social dilemmas has been reliably linked with SVO
(Balliet et al., 2009; Renkewitz, Fuchs, & Fiedler, 2011)
and expectations (or trust) (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013), pro-
viding two pieces of evidence consistent with the mediation
model. Also consistent with the mediation model, it has long
been assumed that personality exerts its influence on behav-
iour by affecting how people construe situations (e.g.
Funder, 2009). This is especially true in situations where de-
cision makers lack information about their interaction part-
ners (e.g. Holmes, 2002).
It is important to note that the expectation-cooperation
link can be explained in two ways: (i) individuals who
exhibit cooperative behaviour might justify their own behav-
iour by expecting cooperation from others (self-justification;
Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977) or (ii) individuals as-
sume that others are similar to themselves and therefore ex-
pect cooperation, which leads them to cooperate (assumed
similarity; Messé & Sivacek, 1979). However, scientific evi-
dence and the three theoretical accounts mentioned before
suggest that expectations precede and determine cooperative
behaviour (Boone et al., 2010; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970a,
1970b; Kuhlman et al., 1986; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975;
Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; Van Lange, 1992). In addi-
tion, if cooperative behaviour would determine expectations
(and not vice versa), the correlation between expectations
and cooperation should be stronger when expectations are
assessed after cooperation. However, a recent meta-analysis
including 104 studies that measured expectations either
before or after decisions of cooperation found that
expectations had the same correlation with cooperation,
regardless of when expectations were measured (Balliet &
Van Lange, 2013).
Altogether, this evidence does not support an alterna-
tive model that cooperation mediates the relation between
SVO and expectations. Instead, these prior research find-
ings provide strong reasons to believe that expected coop-
eration mediates the relationship between SVO and
cooperation in social dilemmas. A more prosocial SVO
leads individuals to expect more cooperation from others,
which subsequently makes them more likely to cooperate
themselves. Even though both psychologists and econo-
mists have prioritized both SVO (i.e. social preferences;
Murphy et al., 2010) and expectations about others’ be-
haviour in predicting behaviour in interdependent situa-
tions (e.g. Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010; Kuhlman &
Wimberley, 1976), very few studies (e.g. Sheldon, 1999)
have directly tested the proposed mediation model
(Bogaert et al. 2008). Hence, existing evidence is incon-
clusive about how strongly SVO corresponds to beliefs
about others’ cooperation, and about the role that expecta-
tions play in understanding how SVO relates to coopera-
tive behaviour. Here, we aim to meta-analytically test
this mediation model and to provide an estimate of the
magnitude of the indirect effect.
Do proselfs cooperate when they expect their partner to
cooperate?
Beyond testing the proposed mediation model, we were also
interested in evaluating the possibility that the mediation
model applies to prosocials, but not to proselfs. Prosocials
are predicted to increase their cooperation when they expect
their partner to cooperate (Boone, Declerck, & Suetens,
2008). However, proselfs may prefer to exploit a partner
who is expected to cooperate and would also most certainly
defect with an uncooperative partner. This reasoning sug-
gests a positive relation between partner expected coopera-
tion and own cooperation among prosocials, but a null
relation among proselfs (especially in a one-shot interaction).
Supporting this hypothesis, Boone et al. (2010) found that
3The three models make predictions about how specific social dynamics and
psychological processes affect how an individual’s own SVO relates to be-
liefs about the distribution of others’ SVO in a population. In the present
meta-analysis, we examine how SVO relates to beliefs about others’ cooper-
ation in a social dilemma. Because both individualists and competitors tend
to defect in social dilemmas, we cannot use these data to test how individu-
alists and competitors differentially project their own SVO on others. For
this reason, we cannot use these data to test different predictions from each
of these three models. Instead, we examine the more general assertion that
SVO should predict expectations of others’ cooperation in social dilemmas
and that these expectations can mediate the relation between SVO and
cooperation.
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expectations increase cooperative behaviour among
prosocials, but not among proselfs.
OVERVIEW OF THE META-ANALYSIS
In summary, we aim to achieve four goals with this meta-
analysis. First, we estimate the magnitude of difference be-
tween each category of SVO in their expectations of others co-
operation: (i) prosocials versus individualists, (ii) prosocials
versus competitors; (iii) individualists versus competitors;
and (iv) prosocials versus proselfs. Second, we test several
study characteristics as possible moderators of the relation be-
tween SVO and expected partner cooperation, such as the type
of participant payment, the number of iterations, or the group
size in a social dilemma. Third, we utilize recent develop-
ments in meta-analysis to estimate the magnitude of the indi-
rect effect of expectations in explaining the link between
SVO and cooperation. This approach will illuminate the de-
gree of importance of expectations as a psychological process
explaining how individual differences in SVO relate to coop-
eration. Fourth, we investigate if cooperation is conditional
upon expectations for prosocials, but not for proselfs. To do
so, we test the relation between expectations and cooperation
separately for prosocials and proselfs.
METHOD
Literature search and inclusion criteria
We systematically searched several scientific databases (Aca-
demic Search Premier, Business Source Premier, EconLit,
PsycInfo, PsycARTICLES, SocINDEX) for relevant English-
written articles with the following search terms in the entire
text of the article: (‘social value orientation’ OR ‘social mo-
tive’) AND (‘expectation of cooperation’ OR ‘expectations
of cooperation’ OR ‘expected cooperation’). This search
returned 795 articles after duplicates were removed, and we
inspected all abstracts. If SVO was mentioned in the abstract,
then we searched the entire article for the inclusion of SVO,
expectations of others’ cooperation, and cooperation in a so-
cial dilemma. This way, we included eight articles with 10
studies. In addition, we searched GoogleScholar and found
six additional articles with six effect sizes. When an article
was published within the last 10 years, but did not include
all necessary statistical information to calculate effect sizes,
we contacted the authors and requested additional informa-
tion. This way, we received data for one additional article with
two studies. Lastly, we contacted authors who had published
on the topic of interest in the past and received two additional
published articles with four studies and four unpublished arti-
cles with 11 studies. We also searched the reference lists of all
articles deemed relevant in this search for other relevant arti-
cles. Finally, we searched all articles included in prior meta-
analyses on SVO and cooperation (Balliet et al., 2009) and ex-
pectations and cooperation (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013).
Overall, we included 21 articles with 33 studies for the com-
parison between prosocials and proselfs in expected partner
cooperation (see Data S1 for a flowchart detailing the
literature search). The earliest included article was from
1976, and our search was conducted through October 2015.
There were several criteria for inclusion. First, studies had
to measure participants’ SVO (e.g. with the TDM, Ring
Measure, or Slider Measure). Second, studies had to include
a measure of participants’ expectations of others’ cooperation
in a social dilemma (e.g. prisoner’s dilemma, public goods di-
lemma, and resource dilemma).4 Lastly, studies had to involve
adult participants (age 18 and above). We excluded studies that
classified participants as prosocials or proselfs based on a goal
choice in a social dilemma task (e.g. Bixenstine, Lowenfeld,
& Englehart, 1981; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970a, 1970b;Miller &
Holmes, 1975). This is a rare measure of social motives, which
shares extensive overlap with decisions in social dilemmas and
which has not been validated against existing measures of
SVO. We also excluded studies using economic games that
are not social dilemmas (e.g. ultimatum or dictator games).
Coding of effect sizes
Two individuals coded all effect sizes and study characteris-
tics: the first author and a trained research assistant. There
was high agreement between coders (96%). All disagreements
were resolved through discussion. Each study contained at
least one coded effect size, and when possible, we coded sev-
eral different effect sizes from each study (described below).
We used the standardized mean difference as the measure of
effect size (Cohen’s d). Cohen’s d is calculated by dividing
the difference between two means by the pooled standard de-
viation and correcting for sample size (Hedges & Olkin,
1985). We calculated the d value by using the mean and stan-
dard deviation of expectations of cooperation for different
types of SVOs. When the descriptive statistics were unavail-
able, we calculated d by using either the t statistic, the F statis-
tic, the chi-square value, the proportion of participants
expecting cooperation, or the correlation coefficient (r)
between SVO and expectations of cooperation. When a
manipulated variable was included in a study, we coded the
main effect of SVO on expectations of cooperation across
conditions. A positive d value indicates that the more
prosocial comparison group expects more cooperation than
the more proself group (i.e. prosocials > proselfs;
prosocials > individualists; prosocials > competitors;
individualists > competitors).
We coded four comparisons on the relation between SVO
and expectations of cooperation: (i) prosocials versus individ-
ualists (k = 20, n = 2686), (ii) prosocials versus competitors
(k = 13, n = 1362), (iii) individualists versus competitors
(k = 13, n = 726), and (iv) prosocials versus proselfs
(k = 33, n = 4793). We use all comparisons to gain a
comprehensive understanding of the relationship between
SVO and expectations and to test for potential modera-
tors. The fourth comparison is also used to test the
4A few studies (e.g. Haselhuhn, Wong, & Ormiston, 2013; Iedema & Poppe,
1995) assessed expectations of others’ behaviours in the same task used to
measure SVO. These were excluded, because they increase the chance of
common-method bias and because the SVO measures are not social
dilemmas.
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mediation model. Table 2 shows the included studies and
their corresponding coded effect sizes and study
characteristics.
Coding of study characteristics
We coded several study characteristics that vary across the
studies included in the meta-analysis. Below, we describe
each study characteristic we coded and the number of studies
with coded effect sizes at each level of the coded variable.
Table 2 reports the coding for each study.
Social value orientation
SVO was measured by using the TDM (k = 16; Van
Lange et al., 1997), the Ring Measure (k = 8; Liebrand &
McClintock, 1988), the Slider Measure (k = 6; Murphy et al.,
2010), or with decomposed games (k = 3; Messick &
McClintock, 1968). Whenever the Slider Measure was used,
we coded the results based on the continuous measurement
of SVO (i.e. we converted the correlation coefficient r to
Cohen’s d). A few older studies asked participants to indicate
their SVO by choosing between a cooperative or a competi-
tive orientation (k = 15; e.g. Bixenstine et al., 1981; Miller
& Holmes, 1975). These studies were excluded from the
main analysis because the decisions of participants to coop-
erate or to compete share extensive overlap with the deci-
sions in the social dilemma, but we also report the results
including these studies to provide a comprehensive over-
view of the literature.
Type of dilemma
We coded the type of social dilemma in the study, including
the prisoner’s dilemma (PD; k = 15), public goods dilemma
(k = 16), and resource dilemma (RD; k = 2). In the PD and
public goods dilemma, individuals decide how much to con-
tribute to a common shared pool, which subsequently accu-
mulates interest (e.g. is doubled) and is then evenly
distributed among all participants. Thus, individuals face
the temptation to benefit from others’ contributions while
not contributing themselves. In the RD, individuals decide
how much to take from a common shared resource, which
is depleted if a certain threshold is reached. In this situation,
participants are tempted to take as much as possible, while
taking too much can deplete the resource. We reverse coded
effect sizes with the RD, so that higher scores indicate greater
cooperation.
The social dilemmas vary on how much conflict they
contain between individual and collective interests. There-
fore, we coded the index of cooperation (K index), which
can range from 0 to 1 and is calculated by (R  P)/
(T  S). A lower value indicates a higher degree of conflict
between individual and collective interests. We coded 31
studies, for which the K index ranged between 0.20 and
0.92 (M = 0.38, SD = 0.13).
Target of expectations
Participants were asked how much cooperation they ex-
pected from the other individual(s) in the social dilemma.
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person in the social dilemma (k = 29), but a few other studies
measured expectations about a typical other person (e.g. the
typical student; k = 4).
Additional codings
We coded whether participants were paid for the outcomes in
the social dilemma (k = 20), received lottery tickets (k = 3),
or were asked to imagine that they were playing for some-
thing valuable (i.e. hypothetical outcomes; k = 10). Partici-
pants either interacted in a one-shot (k = 23) or in an
iterated social dilemma (k = 10). We also coded the number
of iterations as a continuous variable ranging from 1 to 30
(Median = 1; Mode = 1; M = 3.06, SD = 5.04). We coded
whether participants interacted in a dyad (k = 25) or in a
group of three or more individuals (k = 8). Group size
was also coded as a continuous variable, ranging from 2 to
8 (Median = 2,M = 2.70, SD = 1.42). We included both pub-
lished (k = 21) and unpublished studies (k = 12). Most studies
were conducted in the Netherlands (k = 9) and in the USA
(k = 6). Other countries represented in the sample include
Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Japan, Singapore, and
Sweden. Studies were published (or conducted, for unpub-
lished studies) between 1976 and 2016 (Median = 2008).
Overview of analysis
Overall estimated effect sizes
We use Cohen’s d as a measure of effect size and conduct the
meta-analysis in Comprehensive Meta-Analysis software
using inverse variance weights (Borenstein, Higgins, &
Rothstein, 2009). The overall analyses are conducted using
a random effects model because we did not assume to have
sampled all studies out of the population of studies and be-
cause we assumed that the effect size differs between studies
due to differences in study characteristics. In addition to the
mean weighted overall effect size, we report the 95% confi-
dence interval and the 90% prediction interval (Hedges &
Olkin, 1985). Next, we examine the variation in the overall
effect size using indicators of heterogeneity of variance (T,
T2, and I2). T2 is an index of between-study variance
(DerSimonian & Laird, 1986). The I2 index measures vari-
ability in effect sizes due to real (as opposed to chance) dif-
ferences between studies (25% = low, 50% = moderate,
75% = high; Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003).
We then use multiple indices to test for the possibility of
publication bias in our sample. First, we report the distribu-
tion of studies in a funnel plot (in which all studies are plot-
ted according to their sample size and standard error). We
use Duval and Tweedie’s (2000) trim-and-fill method to as-
sess the symmetry of the effect size distribution in the funnel
plot. This method removes small studies at the extremes,
while the effect size is recalculated at each iteration until
symmetry is achieved. Publication bias is present if the inter-
pretation of the newly estimated effect size differs from the
interpretation of the observed effect size. However, readers
should interpret results from the trim-and-fill method with
caution: this method might underestimate the effect size be-
cause it corrects for publication bias that does not exist
(Terrin, Schmid, Lau, & Olkin, 2003) or overestimate the
effect size because it does not adequately correct for publica-
tion bias that does exist (Carter, Hilgard, Schönbrodt, &
Gervais, 2017). Second, we report Begg and Mazumdar’s
rank correlation (Begg & Mazumdar, 1994), which provides
a correlation between the ranks of effect sizes and the ranks
of their variances, and Egger’s regression intercept (Egger,
Davey Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997), which regresses
the standard normal deviate on the study’s precision. Statisti-
cally significant results indicate possible publication bias in
the data. These analyses were conducted with Comprehen-
sive Meta-Analysis software. Third, we examine if published
studies show larger effect sizes than unpublished studies,
which would indicate publication bias. In addition, it is pos-
sible that the selective reporting of statistically significant re-
sults within primary studies influenced our meta-analytic
results. While this possibility cannot be ruled out, we believe
that it is not very likely that it influenced the results of the
current meta-analysis because the relation between SVO
and expectations was often not the main focus of published
studies and because we included several unpublished studies.
Moderation analyses
We test for possible moderators of the relation between SVO
and expectations of others’ cooperation. For these moderation
analyses, we employ Robust Variance Estimation (RVE), a
random-effects meta-regression that can account for depen-
dent effect sizes (Hedges, Tipton, & Johnson, 2010), even
when only a small number of studies are included (Tipton,
2015). This method allows us to conduct moderator analyses
simultaneously on all included effect sizes as opposed to
conducting them on only one comparison (i.e. prosocials ver-
sus proselfs), and therefore increases the power of the moder-
ator analyses. Because the effect sizes are nested within
studies, we use correlated effects RVE with random-effect
weights, and report robust t-tests (results are only trustworthy
if df > 4). We conduct these analyses using the robumeta
package in R and set rho at the recommended .80 (Tanner-
Smith & Tipton, 2014). Whenever a moderator was categori-
cal with three levels (e.g. SVO measure: TDM, Ring, Slider),
we created dummy variables and compared each moderator
level against all others (e.g. 1 = Slider, 0 = Other).
Meta-analytic mediation model
We test the hypothesis that expectations of others’ coopera-
tion mediate the relation between SVO and own cooperation
in social dilemmas. To conduct the meta-analytic mediation
test, we coded two additional effect sizes: (i) SVO predicting
own cooperation and (ii) expectations of others’ cooperation
predicting own cooperation. We used recent meta-analyses
(Balliet et al., 2009; Balliet & Van Lange, 2013) and exam-
ined all studies measuring the relationship between SVO and
expectations to obtain these effect sizes. Studies had to report
at least two of the three effect sizes of interest to be included
in the meta-analysis.5 In a few cases, the sample sizes
5Professor Mike Cheung recommended in a personal consultation that all in-
cluded studies should measure at least two of the three effect sizes of interest
to ensure the validity of the MASEM approach used to examine this
mediation.
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differed between those three coded effect sizes per study, in
which we coded the average sample size across the three effect
sizes. Table 3 reports the studies and their corresponding
coded effect sizes for all studies included to test the mediation
model.
To test the mediation model, we used the correlation
coefficient (r) as the measure of effect size. When the corre-
lation was not reported in the article, we used the same statis-
tics mentioned above to calculate the correlation coefficient
(r). For the correlation between SVO and expectations, a
positive correlation indicates that the more prosocial partici-
pants expect more cooperation from others than more proself
participants (k = 32, n = 4689). The same holds for the corre-
lation between SVO and cooperation: a positive correlation
indicates that the more prosocial participants cooperate
more than the more proself participants (k = 39, n = 5521).
A positive correlation between expectations and cooperation
indicates that higher levels of expected cooperation are
associated with higher levels of cooperation (k = 34,
n = 4932).
We adopted a two-stage random-effects meta-analytic
structural equation modelling (MASEM) approach to exam-
ine the hypothesized mediation effect (Cheung, 2015). This
approach combines meta-analysis with structural equation
modelling. In the first stage, the correlations between all var-
iables (i.e. SVO, expectations, cooperation) from all primary
studies are synthesized into one pooled correlation matrix. In
the second stage, this meta-analytic correlation matrix is
treated as an observed correlation matrix and subjected to a
structural equation model to test the hypothesized mediation
effect. A mediation effect of expected cooperation on the re-
lation between SVO and cooperation would be present if the
indirect effect is significant, while the direct effect decreases
in magnitude or becomes nonsignificant. The MASEM anal-
yses were conducted using default values in R with the
metaSEM package (Cheung, 2014).
Table 3. Studies included in the meta-analytic test of mediation
SVO—EXP SVO—COOP EXP—COOP
Study N r N r N r Coded N
Balliet, Li, et al. (2011) Study 2 85 .332 84 .370 93 .402 87
Study 3 47 .062 49 .220 59 .443 51
Balliet et al. (2016) 680 .114 682 .310 726 .707 696
Balliet (2012) 404 .033 404 .210 404 .517 404
Study 2 111 .099 111 .160 111 .690 111
Study 3 341 .372 341 .160 341 .751 341
Boone et al. (2008) 73 .285 73 .251 73 .645 73
De Bruin and Van Lange (1999) 144 .209 144 .324 — — 144
De Cremer et al. (2008) 88 .227 88 .205 — — 88
De Dreu and McCusker (1997) — — 74 .520 83 .420 78
Eek and Gärling (2006) 54 .421 54 .460 54 .853 54
Kiyonari (2011) 130 .239 131 .391 130 .811 130
Study 2 149 .214 150 .377 149 .539 149
Study 3 54 .425 54 .477 54 .589 54
Kiyonari and Barclay (2008) 87 .120 87 .182 87 .539 87
Study 2 73 .268 73 .378 73 .487 73
Study 3 108 .084 108 .220 108 .503 108
Kiyonari et al. (2008) 119 .254 119 .285 119 .419 119
Study 2 113 .110 113 .387 113 .294 113
Kramer et al. (1986) 53 .217 53 .370 — — 53
Liebrand et al. (1986) 126 .201 126 .310 48 .810 100
Smeesters et al. (2003a) — — 102 .330 203 .590 152
Study 2 186 .160 192 .400 193 .590 190
Study 3 128 .172 132 .420 140 .850 133
Study 4 155 .184 167 .490 167 .590 163
Smeesters et al. (2003b) 140 .111 140 .323 — — 140
Stouten, De Cremer, and Van Dijk (2005) — — 79 .290 108 .410 93
Van Lange (1992) 123 .342 123 .340 144 .800 130
Van Lange (1999) 164 .282 164 .320 — — 164
Van Lange and Kuhlman (1994) — — 334 .270 334 .670 334
Van Lange and Liebrand (1989) 78 .067 78 .340 87 .610 81
Van Lange and Liebrand (1991a) — — 59 .390 59 .750 59
Study 2 — — 56 .340 56 .530 56
Van Lange and Liebrand (1991b) 59 .219 55 .360 55 .380 56
Study 2 — — 60 .420 60 .570 60
Wu et al. (2013) 119 .184 119 .299 119 .724 119
Study 2 195 .187 198 .238 195 .680 196
Study 3 186 .143 197 .176 186 .693 189
Yamagishi et al. (2013) 93 .172 93 .201 93 .812 93
Note. N, Number of participants in study; Coded N, average number of participants across all three effect sizes coded for the meta-analytic structural equation
modelling.
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Expectations and cooperation: prosocials versus proselfs
To examine if expectations and cooperation are positively re-
lated among prosocials, but not among proselfs, whenever
possible, we coded the correlation coefficient (r) between ex-
pectations and cooperation and the sample size N, separately
for prosocials and proselfs (Table 4). Then, we applied the
same meta-analytic techniques outlined above that were used
to examine the relation between SVO and expectations.
The Open Science Framework webpage for this article is
http://osf.io/2dc4p. This webpage contains the dataset and R
script for all analyses conducted using R.
RESULTS
Social value orientation and expectations: overall
estimated effect sizes
We begin by first reporting the estimated average population
effect size for each comparison for SVO and expectations of
cooperation. For each comparison, we report the overall
weighted effect size (with a corresponding confidence inter-
val and prediction interval), estimates of heterogeneity in
the effect size distribution, and three estimates of the pres-
ence of publication bias (Table 5).
Prosocials versus individualists
Prosocials expected significantly more cooperation from
others than individualists, d = 0.402, 95% CI [0.319, 0.485],
90% prediction interval [0.330, 0.474], p < .001. There was
no variance in the true effect size distribution (T = 0.000,
T2 = 0.000, I2 = 0.00). We used Duval and Tweedie’s (2000)
trim-and-fill method to examine publication bias. No effect
sizes were imputed above the overall effect size, but four were
imputed below the overall effect size, which did not change
the overall effect size substantially, d = 0.359, 95% CI
[0.270, 0.449]. Begg and Mazumdar’s rank correlation
(p = .284) as well as Egger’s regression intercept (p = .090)
were nonsignificant, suggesting that publication bias did not
significantly influence these results.
Prosocials versus competitors
Prosocials expected significantly more cooperation from
others than competitors (d = 0.481, 95% CI [0.197, 0.764],
90% prediction interval [0.057, 1.019], p < .01). There
was substantial variation in the true effect size distribution
(T = 0.270, T2 = 0.073), and some of this variation could
be explained by systematic differences between studies
(I2 = 30.52). The trim-and-fill method (Duval & Tweedie,
2000) imputed only two effect sizes below the overall
weighted effect size, which did not substantially change the
interpretation of the effect size, d = 0.440, 95% CI [0.156,
0.724], p < .01. Begg and Mazumdar’s rank correlation
(p = .760) as well as Egger’s regression intercept (p = .989)
were nonsignificant, indicating that publication bias did not
significantly influence the results of this analysis.
Individualists versus competitors
Individualists and competitors did not significantly differ in
their expectations of cooperation, d = 0.022, 95% CI
[0.349, 0.306], 90% prediction interval [0.716, 0.672],
Table 5. Overall average effect sizes, heterogeneity and publication bias
Overall effect size Heterogeneity Publication bias
Type of Effect Size k N d 95% CI 90% PI T T2 I2 B&Mp ERp
Prosocials versus Proselfs 33 4793 0.405 [0.329, 0.481] [0.194, 0.616] 0.118 0.014 30.62 .086 .050
With Goal Choice 48 7414 0.644 [0.516, 0.771] [0.018, 1.306] 0.386 0.149 80.36 .007 .009
Prosocials versus Individualists 20 2686 0.402 [0.319, 0.485] [0.330, 0.474] 0.000 0.000 0.00 .284 .090
Prosocials versus Competitors 13 1362 0.481 [0.197, 0.764] [0.057, 1.019] 0.270 0.073 30.52 .760 .989
Individualists versus Competitors 13 726 0.022 [0.349, 0.306] [0.716, 0.672] 0.359 0.129 41.33 .669 .775
Note. k, number of included effect sizes; d, Cohen’s d; CI, confidence interval; PI, prediction interval; B&Mp, two-sided p value for Begg & Mazumdar’s rank
correlation; ERp, two-sided p value for Egger’s Regression Intercept.
Table 4. Studies included in the meta-analyses on expectations and cooperation separately for prosocials and proselfs
Prosocials Proselfs Overall
Study N r N r N r
Balliet, Li, et al. (2011) Study 2 48 .393 35 .252 93 .402
Study 3 30 .638 19 .085 59 .443
Balliet et al. (2016) 508 .701 172 .721 726 .707
Balliet (2012) 249 .511 155 .550 404 .517
Study 2 81 .796 30 .655 111 .690
Study 3 170 .770 171 .614 341 .751
Boone et al. (2008) 42 .774 31 .472 73 .645
Wu et al. (2013) 97 .699 22 .779 119 .724
Study 2 173 .693 22 .531 195 .680
Study 3 151 .691 35 .674 186 .693
Note. N, Number of participants in study.
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p = .896. There was variation in the true effect size distribution
(T = 0.359, T2 = 0.129), and part of that variation could be
explained by between-study differences (I2 = 41.33).
Using Duval and Tweedie’s (2000) trim-and-fill method,
three studies were imputed below the estimated effect size,
but the interpretation of the overall estimated effect size did
not change (d = 0.131, 95% CI [0.465, 0.203]). Begg and
Mazumdar’s rank correlation (p = .669) and Egger’s Regres-
sion intercept (p = .775) were nonsignificant, suggesting an
absence of publication bias for this comparison.
Prosocials versus proselfs
Overall, prosocials expected greater cooperation than
proselfs (d = 0.405, 95% CI [0.329, 0.481], 90% prediction
interval [0.194, 0.616], p < .001).6 There was variation in
the true effect size distribution (T = 0.118, T2 = 0.014), which
can be explained in part by differences between studies
(I2 = 30.62). Figure 1 displays the funnel plot for this com-
parison. Using the trim-and-fill method (Duval & Tweedie,
2000), 11 studies were inserted below the estimated effect
size. The re-estimated effect size (d = 0.300, 95% CI
[0.213, 0.388]) differed from the original effect size
estimate (d = 0.405), but the confidence intervals still over-
lap. Begg and Mazumdar’s rank correlation (p = .086) was
nonsignificant, whereas Egger’s regression intercept
(p = .050) was significant. However, published studies did
not show a larger effect size (d = 0.395, k = 21) than un-
published studies (d = 0.402, k = 12), Q(1) = 0.005,
p = .945. The publication status also did not moderate the
relation between SVO and expectations when testing it on
the entire sample of studies using RVE moderator analyses
(Table 6). Overall, we find mixed evidence that publication
bias could have influenced the results of this analysis.
Moderators of the social value orientation-expectation
relation
We conducted several univariate moderator analyses to test
whether specific study characteristics moderate the relation
between SVO and expectations.
Table 6 shows the results of the univariate categorical and
continuous moderator analyses using RVE for meta-analyses
(Hedges et al., 2010; Tipton, 2015). Whenever the degrees of
freedom of a moderation analysis were smaller than four, the
results should not be trusted, and we therefore omitted them
from Table 6 (Tipton, 2015). This holds for the following
moderators: payment (1 = lottery, 0 = other), the classification
of SVO (1 = decomposed games, 0 = other), the continuous
codings of group size, and the social dilemma (1 = resource
dilemma, 0 = other). The overall conclusion from these anal-
yses is that none of the coded study characteristics
6The effect size substantially increased after including studies that classified
participants as prosocial or proselfs based on a goal choice in a social di-
lemma task, d = 0.644, 95% CI [0.516, 0.771], 90% prediction interval
[0.018, 1.306], p < .001.
Figure 1. Funnel plot for the comparison between prosocials and proselfs on expected cooperation in social dilemmas.
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significantly moderated the relation between SVO and expec-
tations of others’ cooperation.
Do expectations mediate the SVO-cooperation relation?
In the first step of testing the mediation model, we estimated
an overall pooled correlation matrix using all effect sizes
from primary studies that contain at least two of the three
correlations of interest (Table 7). Each effect size distribution
contained variation that could be explained by systematic
differences between studies (I2 ranging from 39.70% to
89.34%; Table 7). In addition, we can reject the null hypoth-
esis of homogeneity of variance of the correlation matrix
(Q(102) = 538.81, p < .001). These results support our deci-
sion to apply a random-effects model. Replicating the results
of prior meta-analyses (Balliet et al., 2009; Balliet &
Van Lange, 2013), we found a medium-sized overall correla-
tion between SVO and cooperation (r = .317, p < .001),7 and
a large overall correlation between expectations and cooper-
ation (r = .626, p < .001). The correlation between SVO
(prosocial versus proself) and expectations (r = .207,
p < .001) also replicates the effect size reported above
(d = 0.405 or r = .195). The observed correlations, standard
errors, confidence intervals, and estimates of the between-
study variance are displayed in Table 7.
In the second step, we estimated the mediation effect by
fitting a structural equation model to the pooled meta-
analytic correlation matrix. Because the proposed mediation
model is a just identified (saturated) path analysis model,
the chi-square statistic for the model is 0 and the goodness-
of-fit indices common to structural equation modelling are
not applicable (Cheung, 2015). Figure 2 displays the path di-
agram for the mediation model fitted to the pooled meta-
analytic correlation matrix. Although the direct effect
remained significant (c’ = 0.196, 95% CI [0.160, 0.232]), it
decreased in magnitude compared with the meta-analytic es-
timate of the effect size (c = 0.317, 95% CI [0.286, 0.349]).
The indirect effect of SVO on cooperation via expectations
was statistically significant (a*b = 0.121, 95% CI [0.098,
0.146]). These results provide evidence for partial mediation
(Baron & Kenny, 1986).
Does the expectations-cooperation relationship differ
between prosocials and proselfs?
We meta-analysed the correlation between expectations and
cooperation separately for prosocials and proselfs. For
prosocials, there was a strong positive correlation between
expectations and cooperation (r = .684, k = 10, N = 1549,
95% CI [0.617, 0.741], p < .001). There was variation in
the true effect size distribution (T = 0.155, T2 = 0.024), and
parts of this variation could be explained by systematic dif-
ferences between studies (I2 = 76.99). Using Duval and
Tweedie’s (2000) trim-and-fill method, one study was im-
puted below the overall weighted effect size, but this did
Table 7. Overall average effect sizes and heterogeneity included in
the meta-analytic mediation model
Relationship k N r SE 95% CI I2
SVO—EXP 32 4689 .207 .019 [.170, .244] 42.20
SVO—COOP 39 5521 .317 .016 [.286, .349] 39.70
EXP—COOP 34 4932 .626 .025 [.577, .676] 89.34
Note. k, number of included effect sizes; N, number of participants; SE, stan-
dard error; CI, confidence interval.
7We also examined moderators of the relation between SVO and coopera-
tion. These moderator analyses are reported in Data S1.
Table 6. Results of the categorical and continuous univariate moderator analyses on the SVO and expectations of cooperation effect sizes
Variables and Codings n k Intercept ß SE 95% CI for ß t df p T2 I2
Payment
1 = Paid, 0 = Other 33 79 0.361 0.003 0.079 0.160, 0.167 0.040 25.80 .968 .032 41.96
1 = Unpaid, 0 = Other 33 79 0.365 0.004 0.077 0.166, 0.157 0.057 19.20 .955 .033 42.03
Target of Expectation
1 = Other, 0 = Typical 33 79 0.353 0.012 0.056 0.142, .167 0.215 4.08 .840 .033 41.96
Iterations
1 = Yes, 0 = No 33 79 0.352 0.037 0.068 0.112, 0.185 0.534 12.10 .603 .032 41.72
Classification of SVO
1 = TDM, 0 = Other 33 79 0.363 0.000 0.086 0.181, 0.180 0.002 19.30 .998 .032 41.98
1 = Ring, 0 = Other 33 79 0.372 0.030 0.069 0.179, 0.119 0.431 12.80 .674 .033 42.00
1 = Slider, 0 = Other 33 79 0.366 0.010 0.126 0.294, 0.275 0.076 9.36 .941 .033 42.03
Group Size
1 = more than two, 0 = two 33 79 0.350 0.062 0.070 0.097, .221 0.880 8.84 .401 .031 41.60
Dilemma
1 = PD, 0 = Other 33 79 0.353 0.020 0.089 0.163, 0.203 0.224 23.40 .825 .033 42.04
1 = PGD, 0 = Other 33 79 0.378 0.031 0.084 0.204, 0.142 0.369 24.10 .715 .033 42.02
K Index
Continuous 31 77 0.568 0.562 0.364 1.520, 0.400 1.550 4.57 .188 .036 44.66
Publication Status
1 = Published, 0 = Unpublished 33 79 0.314 0.085 0.095 0.114, 0.283 0.891 19.63 .384 .031 41.06
Note. n, number of included studies; k, number of included effect sizes nested within studies; Intercept, intercept of the meta-regression; ß, unstandardized re-
gression coefficient; SE, standard error of ß; df, degrees of freedom; p, p value; T2, tau-squared estimate based on rho = .80; SVO, social value orientation. Be-
cause results are only trustworthy if df > 4, we omitted the following moderator analyses from this table: payment (1 = lottery, 0 = other), the classification of
SVO (1 = decomposed games, 0 = other), the continuous codings of group size, and the social dilemma (1 = resource dilemma, 0 = other).
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not substantially change the interpretation of the effect size,
r = .669, 95% CI [0.601, 0.728]. Begg and Mazumdar’s rank
correlation (p = .999) and Egger’s regression intercept
(p = .961) were both nonsignificant, indicating an absence
of publication bias. For proselfs, there was also a strong pos-
itive correlation between expectations and cooperation
(r = .581, N = 692, k = 10, 95% CI [0.476, 0.669],
p < .001). Again, there was substantial variation in the true
effect size distribution (T = 0.172, T2 = 0.030), and this can
be explained by systematic differences between studies
(I2 = 63.71). Duval and Tweedie’s (2000) trim-and-fill
method did not impute any effect sizes, and Begg and
Mazumdar’s rank correlation (p = .592) and Egger’s regres-
sion intercept (p = .280) were nonsignificant as well. The re-
lation between expectations and cooperation did not
significantly differ between prosocials and proselfs,
Q(1) = 3.314, p = .069.8
DISCUSSION
People experience a wide variety of interdependent situations
with others in their day-to-day lives. In these situations, the
decisions and actions of each person can impact their own
and others’ outcomes. Expectations of others’ behaviour in
interdependent situations are essential to enable successful
coordination, avoid exploitation, and to achieve mutually
beneficial outcomes (Holmes, 2002), and this is especially
true in interdependent situations that involve a conflict of
interests, such as social dilemmas (Balliet & Van Lange,
2013). Yet, in many social dilemma situations, people do
not have any information about their partners. Previous the-
ory suggests that personality may play a pivotal role in
forming expectations of others’ behaviour (Holmes, 2002;
Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). By far, most attention has been
paid to how SVO relates to expectations of partner coopera-
tion in social dilemmas (e.g. Balliet & Van Lange, 2013;
Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976). However, studies have
remained inconclusive about the magnitude of the effect of
SVO on expectations, and especially whether there is a
meaningful difference in the amount of expected partner co-
operation between individualists and competitors. Moreover,
existing research has not provided a strong test of the claim
that expectations play an essential role in mediating the rela-
tion between SVO and cooperation or that SVO moderates
the relation between expectations and cooperation.
We applied meta-analysis to summarize nearly 50 years of
research on the relation between SVO and expectations of
partner cooperation in social dilemmas. Furthermore, we uti-
lized MASEM to examine the proposed mediation of ex-
pected cooperation in the relationship between SVO and
cooperation in social dilemmas. We found a moderate associ-
ation between SVO and expected cooperation in social di-
lemmas. Prosocials expected significantly more cooperation
than individualists (d = 0.402) and competitors (d = 0.481),
but there was no significant difference in expected coopera-
tion between individualists and competitors (d = 0.022).
The relation between SVO and expectations generalized
across variations in the studies, including the type of social di-
lemma, group size, participant payment, and number of itera-
tions. Furthermore, we replicated the results of previous
meta-analyses that both SVO (r = .318) and expectations
(r = .626) are related to cooperative behaviour (Balliet et al.,
2009; Balliet & Van Lange, 2013). Complementing these
findings, we further demonstrated that expectations partially
mediate the relation between SVO and cooperation. We also
found that both prosocial and proselfs increase their coopera-
tion when they expect their partner to cooperate. Together,
these findings illuminate the important role expectations play
8For proselfs, the relation between expected partner cooperation and own co-
operation may be stronger in iterated, compared with one-shot, social di-
lemmas, because cooperation can potentially maximize long-term
outcomes during iterated interactions. However, for proselfs, the overall
weighted effect size was actually significantly smaller in iterated (r = .439,
k = 5, 95% CI [0.218, 0.617], p < .001) than in one-shot social dilemmas
(r = .650, k = 5, 95% CI [0.563, 0.723], p < .001), Q(1) = 4.393,
p = .036. Yet, the number of iterations did not significantly moderate the re-
lation between expectations and cooperation among proselfs (ß = .015,
p = .442). For prosocials, iterations did not moderate the relation between ex-
pectations and cooperation. The results of these analyses should be
interpreted with caution due to low statistical power.
Figure 2. Path diagram of the meta-analytic mediation model of expectations mediating the effect of social value orientation on cooperation.
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in determining and facilitating cooperative behaviour in so-
cial dilemmas for both prosocials and proselfs.
Social value orientation and expectations
In social dilemmas, one’s own outcomes are jointly deter-
mined by one’s own actions and the actions of one’s partner
(or partners, in larger scale dilemmas). Inmany social dilemma
situations, people face a great deal of uncertainty about the
consequences of their decisions, largely because there is no in-
formation about how others will behave. In the absence of in-
formation about how others behave, one’s own preferences
can be a cue on which to base expectations of others’ behav-
iour, and this process tends to be automatic, intuitive, and dif-
ficult to change with explicit contradictory information (for an
overview, see Krueger, 2007). Indeed, we found evidence that
individuals with internalized, dispositional prosocial values
expect more cooperative behaviour from others across differ-
ent types of social dilemmas and independently of which
SVO measure was used. Individuals project their own prefer-
ences onto others (Krueger, 2007), and this can form the basis
of beliefs about others’ behaviour in interdependent situations.
While the results of the meta-analysis support a social
projection process, the results do not allow a comparison of
the three theories explaining why and how SVO relates to ex-
pectations (i.e. triangle hypothesis, SASB, cone model). This
is because these theories make predictions about the expecta-
tions people have about the distribution of SVO in the popu-
lation and not directly about expected cooperation in social
dilemmas. However, Aksoy and Weesie (2012) provided
convincing evidence in support of the cone model by not
only assessing expectations but also variance in expectations.
According to the cone model, social projection, which is as-
sumed to maximize the expected accuracy of one’s own pre-
diction (Krueger, 2007), is used by prosocials, individualists,
and competitors when they project their own preferences
onto others to form expectations. Nonetheless, general con-
ceptions and stereotypes about individuals as selfish but not
competitive (Miller & Ratner, 1998; Vuolevi & Van Lange,
2010; Vuolevi & Van Lange, 2012) can lead individualists
to expect even less cooperation from others compared with
either prosocials or competitors. This also becomes evident
as Aksoy and Weesie (2012) found less variability in expec-
tations among individualists as compared with prosocials and
competitors.
Previous research was inconclusive about how individu-
alists and competitors would differ in their expectations of
others’ behaviour. For example, some previous research sug-
gested that individualists form intermediate expectations of
cooperation, somewhere between prosocials and competitors
(e.g. Van Lange, 1992). Individualists are likely to have a
more varied history of interactions with others, because they
will cooperate (and so elicit cooperation from others) in a
broader range of situations when cooperation is in their
self-interest, such as during possible repeated interactions
(Van Lange, Klapwijk, & Van Munster, 2011a), when be-
haviour can have reputational consequences (Wu, Balliet,
& Van Lange, 2015), and in the presence of possible punish-
ment or rewards (Boone et al., 2010). Competitors tend to
defect across a broader range of situations, have difficulties
even learning how to maintain cooperation, and so tend to
elicit greater non-cooperation from others (McClintock &
Liebrand, 1988; Sattler & Kerr, 1991; Sheldon, 1999).
Therefore, if past experiences partly inform expectations of
others’ behaviour, individualists may expect greater coopera-
tion than competitors. In the present meta-analysis, individu-
alists and competitors did not differ in their expectations of
others’ cooperation. One possible explanation is that non-
cooperation in social dilemmas is the dominating strategy
for both individualists and competitors (Dawes, 1980). There-
fore, in social dilemmas, individualists and competitors do
not differ in their expectations of others’ cooperation, because
their different goals can be achieved by the same non-
cooperative choice. However, when expectations are assessed
in decomposed games for which a dominant choice exists for
each SVO, expectations differ significantly between individ-
ualists and competitors (Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976). Fu-
ture research may benefit from further examining how
individualists and competitors differ in their expectations of
others’ cooperation across various types of interdependent
situations (e.g. stag hunt, battle of the sexes, and maximizing
differences) and across settings known to affect cooperation
(e.g. incentives, communication, and anonymity).
Expectations mediate the social value orientation—
cooperation relationship
Previous research has focused on how SVO and expectations
of others’ cooperation each independently foster cooperative
behaviour (e.g. Balliet et al., 2009; Balliet & Van Lange,
2013). However, it was largely overlooked how these stable
cooperative preferences (i.e. SVO) might lead to increased
expected cooperation, which in turn fosters cooperation.
Using an innovative meta-analytic approach, this study is
the first to provide robust evidence for partial mediation: indi-
viduals with a more prosocial SVO are more likely to cooper-
ate than proself individuals, in part because they expect more
cooperation from others. Thus, SVO exerts a direct effect on
cooperative behaviour and an indirect effect on cooperation
via influencing expectations about partner cooperation.
Altogether, these results provide support for Bogaert
et al.’s (2008) assertion that expectations mediate the
relationship between SVO and cooperation. As such,
cooperative behaviour is more likely to emerge and to be
maintained if individuals with prosocial values expect others
to cooperate. However, it needs to be noted that—due to the
correlational nature of the data—cooperative behaviour could
also lead to higher levels of expected cooperation (Thielmann
& Hilbig, 2014). Expectations and cooperative behaviour are
mutually reinforcing processes, but a wide variety of
experimental studies on social dilemmas suggest that expecta-
tions can cause cooperation (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013;
Boone et al., 2010; Iedema & Poppe, 1994a, 1999; Kelley
& Stahelski (1970a, 1970b); Kuhlman et al., 1986; Kuhlman
& Marshello, 1975; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; Van
Lange, 1992).
While prosocials aim to achieve collective welfare by
cooperating in social dilemmas, the results indicate that more
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prosocial individuals do not cooperate at all costs. Instead,
the likelihood of cooperation among prosocials increases if
they expect others to cooperate as well. This is in line with
the findings from Kuhlman and Marshello (1975), who found
that prosocials show high levels of cooperation in an iterated
PD unless their partner consistently defects. For proselfs, be-
haviour of their partner did not matter as much: Competitors
consistently defect independently of their partner’s actions,
whereas individualists would only cooperate with a partner
pursuing a tit-for-tat strategy. In support of this, Boone
et al. (2010) showed that expecting cooperation fosters coop-
eration for prosocials, whereas expectations do not influence
proselfs’ cooperative behaviour.
Based on this previous research, prosocials, but not
proselfs, would be predicted to condition their cooperation
on their partner’s expected cooperation. Indeed, proselfs
could maximize their own short-term outcomes by exploiting
a partner they expect will cooperate. However, we found that
both prosocials and proselfs equally, and strongly, condition
their cooperation on their partner’s expected cooperation.9
Yet, proselfs expect much less cooperation from others than
prosocials. These findings suggest that proselfs may be en-
couraged to cooperate by reinforcing expectations of partner
cooperation. In fact, even proselfs may maximize their own
long-term outcomes by forming mutually beneficial coopera-
tive relationships. Taken together, these findings indicate that
expectations are equally important for prosocials and
proselfs.
Broader implications
Although this meta-analysis examined dispositional prefer-
ences for cooperation and expectations of others’ coopera-
tion in social dilemmas, the results contain insights about a
broad range of scientific topics and societal challenges. Be-
low, we discuss implications for future research in social
and personality psychology and for the promotion of cooper-
ative behaviour in many societal social dilemmas, such as
public good and resource dilemmas.
Personality, social value orientation, and social behaviour
Personality can determine the construal of situations and the
goals individuals pursue in social interactions (Sherman,
Nave, & Funder, 2013), partly by affecting the expectations
these individuals hold. Thus, the beliefs individuals have
about others’ behaviour in such interdependent situations
can at least partially explain the link between personality
and behaviour. The current meta-analysis is aligned with this
perspective on the importance of personality in the construal
of situations (Sherman et al., 2013) and how people approach
and perceive others (e.g. Felfe & Schyns, 2010; Fong &
Markus, 1982).
Social value orientation is a relatively narrow personality
trait. However, it shares significant overlap with the broader
personality dimension of Honesty-Humility in the HEXACO
(and with Big Five Agreeableness; Hilbig et al., 2014). Re-
search is needed to further consolidate SVO in broader
models of personality and to establish if SVO is a facet of
specific personality traits, such as Honesty-Humility and
Agreeableness. For example, individuals high on Honesty-
Humility weigh their own and others’ outcomes equally
strong, indicating a prosocial preference for fairness in out-
comes. Demonstrating the generalizability of our findings
to a broader personality construct, Pfattheicher and Böhm
(2017) found that the relation between Honesty-Humility
and cooperation in a trust game was mediated by social ex-
pectations about the trustworthiness of others. To further ex-
amine if our findings generalize to broader personality
constructs, future research could examine if individuals scor-
ing high on Honesty-Humility expect others to score simi-
larly high on Honesty-Humility, especially with limited
information about the other (i.e. social projection), which
would subsequently lead to more cooperative behaviour with
the other. It might be that such a process is fully mediated by
SVO. For example, people who are high on Honesty-
Humility tend to think situations contain less conflict of inter-
ests, but this is completely mediated by SVO (Gerpott,
Balliet, Columbus, Molho, & De Vries, in press). Further-
more, those perceptions of conflict partially mediated the re-
lation between SVO and cooperative behaviour. Such
findings underscore the importance of personality in how
people think about others, and ultimately behave, during in-
terdependent situations. More work is needed on how SVO
fits in the broader nomological network of personality con-
structs, and to what extent, if any, SVO can account for
how broader personality constructs relate to social behaviour.
Social value orientation and trust
Expectations of others’ behaviour in social dilemmas can be
considered an operationalization of trust. Trust is often de-
fined as a belief about another’s benevolent motive toward
oneself (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt,
& Camerer, 1998). Indeed, if people expect others to cooper-
ate in social dilemmas, this means they believe that the other
person is willing to engage in costly behaviour to provide
them a benefit. So far, research on SVO and expectations
has largely neglected to address the link between SVO and
trust—it remains an open topic of research. Preliminary evi-
dence indicates that prosocials tend to be more trusting than
proselfs (Kanagaretnam, Mestelman, Nainar, & Shehata,
2009), and that individuals scoring high on Honesty-
Humility, a personality domain that shares significant over-
lap with SVO (Hilbig et al., 2014), are also more trusting to-
ward others, but do not trust others unconditionally
(Pfattheicher & Böhm, 2017). Nevertheless, there remains a
need to generalize the SVO-expectation relation to how
SVO relates to various measures of state and trait trust. It
may be that SVO is affecting variability in expectations of
others’ behaviour in social dilemmas, but not necessarily
trust. That is, prosocial people may expect others to cooper-
ate, but they believe that others are simply cooperating out of
their own self-interest or for other reasons besides their inter-
nalized benevolent motives (e.g. the threat of being punished
or a motive to maintain their reputation). It could also be that
prosocial individuals are responding more strongly to or are
even actively looking for cues that could be used to infer9This statistical test contains only a few studies and has low statistical power.
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trust in others. For example, recent findings from an eye-
tracking study indicate that deviations from a purely selfish
value orientation (i.e. individualistic) predict how much at-
tention is directed to searching for information about the
others’ payoff in social dilemmas (Fiedler, Glöckner,
Nicklisch, & Dickert, 2013), and these differences in infor-
mation search might generalize to other situations. The find-
ings in the present meta-analysis underscore the need to
further examine how SVO relates to trust.
Practical implications
The findings also emphasize several opportunities to strate-
gically promote cooperation outside of the laboratory. Most
of the empirical work on cooperation centres on how coop-
eration can be promoted to enhance solidarity and prosper-
ity in and between societies. For example, SVO and trust
have been studied as predictors of various organizational
outcomes (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001), commuting preferences
(Van Lange et al., 1998; Van Vugt, Meertens, & Van
Lange, 1995), and adherence to tax laws (Van Dijke &
Verboon, 2010). But in these situations, an enhanced thresh-
old to cooperate exists because such cooperative behaviour
increases the risk of exploitation and abuse from others.
One approach to promote cooperation is to reduce the con-
flict of interests and so align the goals of prosocials, individ-
ualists, and competitors (Smith, 1979). Yet, these structural
changes to payoff matrices might be very difficult or even
impossible to implement. For example, most common re-
sources, such as limited water supply in certain areas, can-
not be equally split between all members of society due to
practical or political limitations. In such situations, punish-
ment for non-cooperation or reward for cooperation can in-
crease expectations that others cooperate, and ultimately
promote cooperative behaviour (Balliet, Mulder, & Van
Lange, 2011; Buckley, Burns, & Meeker, 1974).
Another approach to promote cooperation in interdepen-
dent situations would be to ensure that individuals perceive
that others are cooperating as well. If the expectation arises
that others are cooperating, own cooperation becomes more
likely. In addition, trust in others often supports one’s own
goals, thereby reinforcing the influence of individual predis-
positions on behaviour. Political messages or marketing cam-
paigns, for example, should highlight the high percentage of
individuals who already cooperate, instead of mentioning the
percentage of individuals who do not cooperate. By enhanc-
ing perceived similarity among individuals, interpersonal
trust and expectations of cooperation increase and reciprocal
cooperation becomes more likely (Fischer et al., 2013). Such
reciprocal cooperation can lead to substantial increases in
collective action and in benefits for society as a whole (Fehr
& Gächter, 2000). Importantly, our findings suggest such ap-
peals would affect everyone because once the expectation
that others cooperate is elicited, it is associated with in-
creased cooperation levels for prosocials and proselfs.
Hence, the current findings may be used to promote any
prosocial behaviour, such as voting, recycling, volunteering,
or donating to charities.
Another practical implication of the current findings
pertains to partner selection. Especially in dyadic contexts,
individualists and competitors might often find their initial
beliefs confirmed by eliciting selfish behaviour from others
through their own selfish actions (Kelley & Stahelski,
1970a, 1970b; Miller & Holmes, 1975), leading prosocials
to selectively interact with other cooperatively minded indi-
viduals (Rand, Arbesman, & Christakis, 2011). Hence, our
findings may generalize to partner selection because coop-
erative individuals are more likely to be selected as future
social partners (Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011), and indi-
viduals who select their future partners might be largely
guided by their beliefs about the others’ motives. As such,
it is possible that prosocials only form lasting social rela-
tionships with other prosocials. However, it might also be
that prosocials are initially more open to forming new rela-
tionships, whereas proselfs are more sceptical and reluctant,
and only form lasting relationships with others when addi-
tional information is available. The influence of cooperative
preferences on partner selection promises to be another
fruitful avenue for future research.
LIMITATIONS
The current meta-analysis is not without limitations. Despite
strong theoretical and empirical reasons that support the hy-
pothesis that expectations mediate the relation between
SVO and cooperation, the meta-analytic mediation model
cannot support claims about causality. In fact, the position
of all variables in the mediation model could be re-arranged,
and the outcome of the mediation model would remain un-
changed. We did consider alternative models. For example,
we did consider the possibility that cooperation mediates
the relation between SVO and expectations (cf. self-
justification; Messé & Sivacek, 1979), but did not find this
model to be a viable alternative because of research showing
that manipulated expectations result in increased levels of co-
operation (e.g. Boone et al., 2008; Kuhlman & Marshello,
1975), and because the correlation between expectations
and cooperation is not stronger when expectations are
assessed after versus before the measurement of cooperation
(Balliet & Van Lange, 2013). Another model would be
that cooperation determines SVO. However, this alterna-
tive is countered by the fact that SVO acts as a relatively
stable personality characteristic (e.g. Van Lange, 1999;
Van Lange et al., 2012), and most of the studies included
in the meta-analysis (i) measure SVO before cooperation
and (ii) involved anonymous one-shot interactions. There-
fore, based on existing theory and research, we believe
that the mediation model we present here is the most
plausible model.
Future research could consider using an instrumental var-
iable (IV; Angrist et al., 1996) to determine if expected part-
ner cooperation has a causal effect on cooperation and
mediates the relation between SVO and cooperation. IVs
are used to determine causality, but a requirement of this
method is that the IV only affects the dependent variable (co-
operation) through the mediating variable (expectations), but
not directly. As such, IVs are usually hard to identify. Possi-
bly, information about a partner’s past behaviour toward
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others (i.e. reputational information) could serve as such an
IV. Future research might also examine if the effect of part-
ner reputational information on own cooperation (Wu,
Balliet, & Van Lange, 2016) only occurs through expecta-
tions of partner cooperation, and then test the mediating ef-
fect of expectations on the relation between SVO and
cooperation (also including the IV in the model). This ap-
proach could address another limitation of the current meta-
analysis: because the meta-analytic structural equation model
was a just identified (saturated) path model, and contained no
degrees of freedom, we could not evaluate the model’s fit. If
an IV would be added to the model, then the direct path from
this IV to cooperation could be omitted to gain one degree of
freedom, allowing for model fit to be evaluated.
CONCLUSION
For nearly 50 years, theory and research on social dilemmas
has devoted significant attention to SVO and expectations of
cooperation as two important variables predicting coopera-
tion in social dilemmas. The current meta-analysis is the first
quantitative review of this literature that examines the inter-
play between both of these classic variables. We show that
stable personality differences (i.e. SVO) predict expectations
of cooperation, which in turn predict levels of cooperation in
social dilemmas. Importantly, expectations are positively re-
lated to cooperation for both prosocials and proselfs. Thus,
this meta-analysis helps to solve one puzzle of human coop-
eration. Although SVO and expectations of others’ coopera-
tion exert independent influences on cooperation, we now
have strong evidence that these variables are interrelated in
shaping human cooperation, with expectations partially me-
diating the relation between SVO and cooperation.
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